Modeling the C(o)urse of Privacy-critical Location-based Services – Exposing Dark Side Archetypes of Location Tracking by Burmeister, Fabian et al.
Modeling the C(o)urse of Privacy-critical Location-based Services – 




University of Hamburg 
burmeister@informatik.uni-hamburg.de 
Paul Drews 
Leuphana University of Lüneburg 
paul.drews@leuphana.de 
Ingrid Schirmer 





With the ubiquitous use of mobile devices, location-
based services (LBS) have rapidly pervaded daily life. 
By providing context- and location-specific information, 
LBS enable a myriad of opportunities for individuals 
and organizations. However, the manifold advantages 
come along with a radical increase in location privacy 
concerns and non-transparent data flows between the 
various actors involved. While research often focuses on 
protecting the dyadic relation between the user and LBS 
provider, the entirety of dark sides constituting privacy 
violations remains hidden. In this paper, we follow the 
paradigm of architectural thinking to shed light on the 
diverse dark sides emerging in today’s LBS. By drawing 
on a multiple case study and developing a notation for 
architectural maps that help understand LBS from a 
socio-technical and privacy-oriented perspective, we 
reveal six dark side archetypes of LBS. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The worldwide spread of mobile devices along with 
technological advances that enable accurately locating a 
user’s or object’s position has led to a rapid increase in 
location-based services (LBS) [1]. Often realized via 
mobile applications, LBS provide information tailored 
to the location and context of a user [2]. While in the past 
LBS were primarily used for navigation purposes, their 
scope has been expanded to social networking (e.g., 
locating friends), advertising (e.g., promotional alerts), 
healthcare (e.g., fitness monitoring) and other domains 
(e.g., weather forecast) [2, 3]. In fact, the global LBS 
market size was valued at $36.2 billion in 2019 and is 
predicted to reach $157.3 billion by 2026 [4]. 
Although LBS offer several advantages, they require 
people to disclose their location, personal preferences, 
and the context they are currently facing [1, 2, 5]. In 
addition, LBS often come at the cost of sharing one’s 
private identity and location data with untrusted or even 
unknown third parties, raising serious privacy concerns 
[6]. These concerns refer, for example, to the disclosure 
of visited locations or daily habits [2, 6]. While service 
providers declare they process and share personal data 
only in an aggregated and non-identifiable form, the idea 
that personal data can successfully be anonymized is 
controversially discussed [3, 7]. Indeed, in a 2019 study, 
researchers were able to correctly re-identify 99.98% of 
participants in an anonymized dataset [7]. In this regard, 
location data can be considered as particularly privacy-
critical by acting as a quasi-identifier of users through a 
sequence of spatio-temporal constraints [6, 8]. Recently, 
as part of its long-term privacy project, The New York 
Times published a special issue on the threat posed by 
LBS, highlighting how easily people can be identified 
by only using location data, i.e., without identifiers like 
user’s Ad ID or phone number [9]. Identifying a person 
requires only four time-stamped location records [10]. 
LBS research has created a large body of knowledge 
on privacy-enhancing technologies and privacy threat 
models, and a plethora of algorithms and methods to 
prevent inference attacks [1, 3, 6, 8]. However, scholars 
claim that most studies focus on the dyadic relationship 
between the user and service provider, leading to a lack 
of transparency about socio-technical relations between 
the various actors participating in LBS and a missing 
understanding of the associated diversity of dark sides 
that may impair user’s location privacy [2, 11, 12]. In 
addition, both information systems (IS) and privacy 
researchers call for more design science orientation to 
provide approaches that help different practitioners (e.g., 
app developers, policy makers) capture the complexity 
of data sharing mechanisms today and enable a common 
understanding of privacy-related dark sides [11, 13]. 
Against this background, in this paper we aim to shed 
light on the heterogeneity of dark sides affecting location 
privacy as well as on the underlying determinants. For 
this purpose, we draw on the paradigm of architectural 
thinking [14, 15] to decompose LBS from both a socio-
technical and privacy-oriented perspective. Having its 
origin in the enterprise architecture management (EAM), 
architectural thinking is a rather lightweight approach 
that seeks to support researchers and practitioners in 
understanding complex causalities through architectural 





maps that visualize socio-technical elements and their 
relations in a simplified form [16]. Following a design 
science approach [17], we develop a notation for LBS-
related architectural maps and use this notation as a 
means to identify privacy-related dark sides. Moreover, 
we classify these dark sides into archetypes representing 
recurring practices of privacy violation. We argue that 
exploring LBS from an architectural perspective reveals 
causalities for privacy-related dark sides at a detailed 
socio-technical level and assists both researchers and 
practitioners in various tasks related to location privacy 
(e.g., legal judgment of specific LBS). Therefore, our 
study deals with the following research question: 
Which archetypes of privacy-related dark sides can 
be identified in location-based services by taking an 
architectural perspective?  
To answer this research question, we conduct an 
explorative multiple case study [18] of privacy-critical 
cases related to LBS, which are widely reported in the 
public media. By collecting and analyzing data on these 
cases, we first develop the notation and then apply it to 
identify dark side archetypes in the field of LBS.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
In the next section, we summarize literature relevant to 
our research context. Then, we present our methodology 
and continue with a description of our results. Finally, 
we discuss our results and give a conclusion. 
 
2. Related research  
 
We identified three streams of related research. The 
first stream points out definitions, types, and elements 
of LBS. The second stream describes location privacy 
and related main areas of research, but also introduces 
dark sides and archetypes. The third stream differentiates 
architectural thinking from EAM and outlines models 
for extending architectural maps through a privacy lens. 
 
2.1 Location-based services 
 
In recent years, the availability and use of LBS has 
increased significantly [1, 4]. Roughly defined, LBS are 
“services that take the user’s current or past location as 
input to provide a service” [11, p. 148]. Other authors 
concretize the activities performed by LBS, defining 
them as “services that create, compile, select, or filter 
information based on the current locations of the users 
or those of other persons or mobile objects” [19, p. 214]. 
While the first definition is rather simple and lacks a 
specification of relevant entities, the second definition 
does not consider past location data. Abbas et al. define 
LBS as “an application that combines the location or 
position of a mobile device associated with a given 
entity (individual or object) together with contextual 
information, to offer a value added service and/or fulfil 
a particular need for the user across a wireless network” 
[20, p. 3]. Our work follows this definition, because it 
considers the context of a service as an aspect essential 
to judge privacy compliance of LBS [20, 21]. 
The literature suggests several criteria for classifying 
LBS. In the first instance, it can be distinguished between 
push-based LBS, where location-related information is 
proactively provided to the user when a specific event 
occurs, and pull-based LBS, where users directly request 
location-related information [19, 22]. In addition, LBS 
can be classified into single-target (tracking the position 
of a certain target) or multi-target LBS (interrelating the 
positions of many targets) and outdoor or indoor LBS [2, 
19]. Küpper and Treu list further classifications [19]. 
The LBS value chain is realized by the interaction of 
various social and technical elements. While the former 
embody the different actors in LBS, such as users, LBS 
providers, developers, network operators, and content 
providers [5, 11, 19], the latter refer to the underlying 
information technology (IT), including devices (e.g., 
smartphones), communication networks (e.g., wireless 
local and cellular networks), positioning components 
(e.g., global positioning system (GPS)), and software 
(e.g., operating systems) [3, 5, 11]. The LBS value chain 
is unique insofar as a single provider is unable to make 
a complete offering to customers, leading to an inter-
organizational matter, i.e., a situation where multi-actor 
collaboration is crucial [20]. Moreover, as LBS are used 
in dynamic and mobile environments, they are aware of 
the context their users are in and accordingly customize 
the content and presentation of information [23]. 
 
2.2 Location privacy and dark side archetypes 
 
Research on location privacy is gaining increasing 
importance. As a subset of information privacy, which is 
“the ability of the individual to control the terms under 
which personal information is acquired and used” [22, 
p. 138], location privacy refers to “the capability of the 
target person to exercise control about who may access 
her location information in which situation and in which 
level of detail” [19, p. 233]. Wang and Liu stress three 
unique characteristics of location privacy, which impose 
major research challenges [8]. First, requirements for 
location privacy are inherently user-dependent (e.g., 
some users regard their location as private, while others 
care about service quality). Second, there is a trade-off 
between location privacy and utility (e.g., more precise 
location data leads to higher service quality). Third, 
location data is updated frequently and processed in real 
time, bearing the risk of inferring user locations [8]. 
In IS research, most studies on location privacy focus 
on the development of technical mechanisms to prevent 
different types of attacks [3, 6, 8]. Based on their target, 
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these attacks can be classified into identity attacks (e.g., 
de-anonymization of users by their address) and location 
attacks (e.g., exposure of regularly visited places) [5]. As 
a counterpart, location privacy preserving mechanisms 
include cryptographic methods (e.g., encryption of user 
positions), anonymization techniques (e.g., suppression 
and generalization to achieve k-anonymity), as well as 
obfuscation (e.g., dummy locations mask true positions) 
[1, 5, 6]. While these attacks and mechanisms usually 
refer to the dyadic relation between a user and malicious 
actor, the complexity of privacy violations in today’s 
LBS requires exploring the manifold dark sides that are 
unwittingly triggered by users or appear in different data 
sharing practices of socio-technical elements [11, 20]. 
Dark sides can be defined as “‘negative’ phenomena 
that are associated with the use of IT, and that have the 
potential to infringe the well-being of individuals, 
organizations, and societies” [24, p. 161]. In our context, 
we also understand dark sides as privacy-critical actions 
or mechanisms in LBS that are hidden to or not expected 
by actors, especially users, and are part of or constitute 
a privacy violation. Classifying archetypes that are “a 
very typical example of a certain person or thing” [25], 
can help identify recurring patterns of dark sides causing 
a privacy violation. Therefore, we use the term dark side 
archetype to describe typical examples of how multiple 
dark sides in combination or in a specific sequence lead 
to a violation of location privacy. Archetypes are special 
as they do not only occur in one case, but can be found 
across multiple cases. Schilling et al. explicitly call for 
increased attention to archetypes in IS research [26]. To 
identify the archetypes, we consider both the context and 
sequence in which dark sides appear in a case. While the 
literature outlines types of privacy violations in LBS, 
such as location-based advertising or profiling, there is 
a lack of knowledge about the specific causalities [12]. 
 
2.3 Architectural maps and privacy models 
 
Architecture comprises “the fundamental concepts 
or properties of a system in its environment embodied 
in its elements, relationships, and in the principles of its 
design and evolution” [27, p. 2]. The architecture of an 
enterprise has business, software, and hardware layers, 
and is managed by the EAM, which seeks to improve 
business IT alignment and transparency [15]. For this, 
EAM refers to enterprise architecture (EA) models that 
address specific stakeholder concerns [14]. A prevalent 
EA modeling language is ArchiMate, which proposes 
several elements and relations to structure the EA [28]. 
However, recent studies claim that EAM is mainly 
used by IT experts and is rather formal [14, 15]. Thus, 
EAM should evolve to architectural thinking as a more 
pragmatic approach performable by non-architects [14]. 
Instead of providing complex EA models, architectural 
thinking builds upon architectural maps that visualize 
socio-technical elements and relations in a simple form 
[16]. Thereby, critical causalities can be highlighted and 
discussed by different types of decision-makers [14, 16]. 
So far, architectural maps have only been proposed 
at the enterprise level in form of strategic theme maps, 
capability maps, or value stream maps, but not in the 
inter-organizational privacy context [16]. Closest to such 
architectural maps are privacy models that classify the 
different actors involved in data sharing networks [11, 
20, 29]. For example, Conger et al.’s model suggests 
differing between first, second, third, and fourth parties 
[29]. In the context of LBS, a few models cover some 
technical elements like LBS servers or mobile devices 
[3, 5]. However, all these models focus on explaining 
the actors that are generally interacting in LBS, but do 
capture neither the concrete socio-technical relations nor 
the related dark sides causing privacy violations in LBS. 
Summing up, IS research on location privacy often 
focuses on technically improving the security between 
users and LBS providers, but is lacking a comprehensive 
understanding of the various dark sides, especially those 
caused by third parties, that lead to privacy violations. 
Moreover, pragmatic approaches are missing that enable 
visualizing socio-technical relations and dark sides in 
LBS. By addressing our research question, we aim to 
contribute to this research gap and support researchers 
and practitioners in performing different tasks related to 
location privacy, such as case analysis or legal judgment.  
 
3. Methodology  
 
In our study, we followed a design science oriented 
research approach [17]. We developed a notation for 
architectural maps that visualize LBS from both a socio-
technical and privacy perspective as a means to identify 
dark side archetypes currently emerging in LBS. In a 
multiple case study [18], we identified the modeling 
elements for the notation exploratory while searching 
for criteria to classify the archetypes. We evaluated the 
notation in a focus group and modeled all cases to verify 
the archetypes. Figure 1 shows the steps of our study. 
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Figure 1. Methodology 
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3.1 Data collection 
 
In the initial collection of privacy-critical cases, we 
followed a theoretical replication logic [18] where cases 
are selected to predict contradictory results. We hereby 
intended to cover a high variety of cases. Privacy-critical 
in our sense are cases reporting on a misuse of location 
data or a threat to location privacy caused by an LBS 
provider, but not cyberattacks or IT security incidents. 
Figure 2 shows our process of case selection. In the first 
step, we searched for news articles on four widespread 
news platforms (CNet, The Guardian, The New York 
Times, and ZDNet). We used the search term “Privacy 
AND Location OR GPS” and considered a publication 
period from January 2018 to May 2020, resulting in 
1308 potential cases (n is the number of cases, i.e., in 
steps 1 and 2 every news article could have represented 
a suitable case). In the second step, we read the title of 
all news articles in our filter and, if applicable, their 
abstract. While we recorded 212 articles describing an 
eligible privacy-critical case in a case study database 
[18], we excluded the others. For example, we had to 
exclude hundreds of articles reporting on cyberattacks 
or security updates. In the third step, we studied the 212 
articles, removed those not focusing on location data, 
and removed duplicates by assigning articles reporting 
on the same scandal to a unique case number, resulting 
in 29 cases. In the fourth step, we collected additional 
data material on each case, such as official responses 
from accused LBS providers, by conducting a backward 
search using the links in the articles. In the fifth step, we 
aggregated the data material per case and excluded eight 
cases exhibiting insufficient or inaccurate information. 
Following our aim of identifying archetypes, in the sixth 
step we switched to a literal replication logic [18] and 
selected those cases predicted to provide similar results 















 1. News articles identified by platform searching (n = 1308)  
CNet (476), Guardian (237), NY Times (290), ZDNet (305) 
 
2. Screening of articles by reading title and abstract (n = 212) 
























 3. Case assignment and further exclusion of articles by detailed 
reading and duplicate removal across platforms (n = 29) 
  
 4. Collection of additional data material (e.g., blog entries) per 
case by backward search via the links in each article (n = 29)  
  
 5. Aggregation of data material per case and exclusion of cases 
exhibiting insufficient or inaccurate information (n = 21) 
  
 6. Selection of similar cases by comparing their content and 
considering their impact (n = 15) 
Figure 2. Process of case selection 
Table 1 lists the data material collected for the final 15 
cases, together with a link to an exemplary news article. 
In total, we collected 83 news articles, 9 blog entries, 19 
tweets, 4 official responses, 2 studies, and 7 technical 
reports throughout the cases. The diversity of documents 
allowed us to triangulate data per case and thus increase 
the reliability and validity of our study [18]. 
 
Table 1. Data material collected per case 
No. Description N B T O S R Link 
1 Strava leaked secret army bases 7 1 2   1 Link 
2 MoviePass tracked user locations 4  1 1  1 Link 
3 Kids gaming apps share user data 6 2   1  Link 
4 Polar leaked soldiers’ location data 5   1   Link 
5 GasBuddy sells data to Reveal Mobile 7 1 1    Link 
6 Weather Channel app amasses data 6  1    Link 
7 Mobile carriers sold location data 7 1 3   2 Link 
8 AccuWeather shared location data 11 1 2 1 1  Link 
9 Shutterfly collects visits via photos 3     1 Link 
10 Netflix’s Android app tracked users 3  1    Link 
11 Pokémon GO data used for profiling 7 1 2    Link 
12 TikTok accused of sharing user data 5 2 4 1   Link 
13 Family locator Life360 shares data 4      Link 
14 Ring’s Neighbors leaks location data 5  2   1 Link 
15 Care19 app shares sensitive user data 3     1 Link 
Σ 83 9 19 4 2 7  
Legend: N = news article, B = blog entry, T = tweet, O = official  
              response, S = study, R = technical report 
 
3.2 Data analysis 
 
To identify dark side archetypes and related socio-
technical elements across the 15 cases, we conducted a 
qualitative content analysis of the data material [30] via 
MAXQDA. We followed Saldaña’s advice that multiple 
coding cycles constitute a rigorous data analysis [30], as 
we performed three coding cycles. In the first cycle, we 
combined deduction and induction. We set up a coding 
agenda [30] consisting of a priori codes we deductively 
received from the literature. These codes included LBS’ 
basic elements (e.g., devices, users) [3, 5, 11, 19], actors 
and relations highlighted by privacy models (e.g., fourth 
parties) [11, 29], and key aspects for assessing privacy 
violations (e.g., context change) [21, 22]. As induction 
also enabled an open coding of the content, we refined 
our coding agenda with several codes we identified that 
were not covered by the selected literature. For example, 
in many cases software development kits (SDK) and data 
aggregators were considered as malicious elements, but 
also privacy-critical actions of LBS providers like user 
profiling. In the second coding cycle, we reviewed and 
reorganized the codes we received from induction and 
deduction by using axial coding. As the coding cycle 
evolved, we combined the codes into broader, theme-
focused categories [30]. For example, while we assigned 
the codes “user” and “LBS provider” to the category 
“actors”, we categorized “augmented reality game” and 
“SDK” as “applications”. In the third coding cycle, we 
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used selective coding to reveal cause-effect patterns in 
the data material [30]. For each case, we interlinked the 
categories and codes across the text passages to identify 
the relations constituting dark sides. By comparing the 
dark sides across the cases, we revealed six archetypes. 
 
3.3 Development and evaluation 
 
Based on the identified socio-technical elements and 
relations constituting dark sides in LBS, we developed a 
notation for deriving architectural maps that seek to help 
researchers and practitioners understand privacy-critical 
cases at first glance. For the maps’ layout, we used the 
categories from our axial coding as layers and referred 
to the syntax and graphical notation of ArchiMate [28]. 
Adding an actor layer was especially important to ensure 
an inter-organizational perspective. To demonstrate and 
evaluate the notation in a focus group, we exemplarily 
modeled architectural maps for the cases 8 and 11, since 
these are described as particularly privacy-critical and 
exhibit different characteristics. The focus group session 
was attended by three lawyers, two executives, one IT 
expert, and one researcher. Together we discussed the 
usability and utility of the maps. Regarding usability, 
the participants highly appreciated the layered structure 
and simplicity of the maps. However, since ArchiMate’s 
original notation looks slightly formal, they suggested 
integrating icons to distinguish the modeling elements 
more clearly and using different line styles to clarify the 
multiple types of relations. Regarding utility, the experts 
approved that lightweight visualizations, such as our 
architectural maps, are urgently needed to make privacy 
violations comprehensible in a simple form. Especially 
the lawyers emphasized the lack of such visualizations 
in the legal literature, since they provide a valuable basis 
for discussing complex causalities. After improving the 
notation in line with the evaluation results, we modeled 
all 15 cases to verify the notation’s completeness. By 
comparing the modeled relations for similarity, we were 
also able to validate the correct assignment of each case 
to one of the six archetypes. 
Table 2 lists the modeling elements of our notation. 
Following the claim that architectural thinking is rather 
lightweight, our notation covers those socio-technical 
elements and relations necessary to give an overview of 
privacy-related dark sides in LBS. Hence, architectural 
maps derived from our notation are not intended to give 
details of internal data processing, for example. The 
notation suggests modeling elements distributed across 
actors, applications, and IT infrastructure layers, as well 
as their different types of relations, such as data flows. 
The dark side element fulfills two functions: it describes 
a privacy-critical action and allows the tracing of a case 
by specifying a sequence. Timers additionally indicate 
the frequency with which a dark side occurs. 
Table 2. Notation for architectural maps of LBS 







Covers users and LBS providers, but 
also other (malicious) parties involved, 












Embodies applications, such as mobile 
apps providing LBS and operating 
systems of devices. 
 
SDK 
Shows SDKs provided by third parties. 
SDKs are used to enhance applications 















Represents mobile devices of users, 
including smartphones, tablets, 
wearables, and others. 
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 Shows servers of LBS providers or 
third parties. Comprises technical 
entities like databases and is especially 








s Data flow 
Illustrates any kind of data transmission 
between elements.  
Permission 
Shows whether an element has granted 
permission or not.  
Other 
Specifies any other type of relation like 










Describes a dark side caused by an 
element. Dark sides are bound to 
relations and sequenced by (n). 
 
Timer 
Indicates the frequency with which a 













Clusters elements and reduces the 
number of relations needed.  
 
 
4. Results  
 
While each case has unique characteristics, taking a 
socio-technical perspective in the data analysis revealed 
common dark sides across the 15 cases. By comparing 
the context and sequence in which the dark sides occur, 
we identified six dark side archetypes that represent 
prevalent violations of location privacy in LBS. We 
present each archetype by illustrating the architectural 
map of a selected case and explaining the similar cases.   
 
4.1 Leakage of secret locations through publicly 
available maps offered by LBS providers 
 
The first archetype is exposed by the cases 1 and 4. 
Case 1 refers to Strava, a social network for athletes, 
which allows its users to compare, time, and share their 
exercises. For this, Strava collects fitness and location 
data of running, cycling, and swimming routes via the 
Strava mobile app or fitness trackers. Strava offers a 
publicly available heat map that shows the activity of its 
users all over the world, containing 3 trillion latitude and 
longitude points. Military analysts noticed that the heat 
map is detailed enough to uncover secret army bases, as 
a subset of users are soldiers on duty. While these bases 
are invisible in LBS like Google Maps, their layout can 
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be seen on Strava’s heat map, where cities are aglow 
with jogging routes and foreign army bases in remote 
areas stand out as isolated hotspots. The heat map also 
reveals which bases are mostly used and which routes 
are taken by soldiers. In addition, soldiers can easily be 
tracked by cross-referencing their Strava data with other 
social media use. According to our analysis, three dark 
sides constitute this archetype (see Figure 3). First, most 
users (i.e., also soldiers) opt for including their data in 
the map, as this is Strava’s default setting. Second, the 
map is publicly available and updated monthly. Third, 
the map can be misused for various malicious purposes.  
 
 
Figure 3. Architectural map of Strava leaking 
secret locations through its heat map (case 1) 
 
The same happened with the fitness app Polar (case 
4). For most users who set their data to public, posting 
their workouts on Polar’s Explore map is a feature and 
not a privacy issue. Even if profiles are set to private, 
fitness activities can reveal where users live. Both cases 
demonstrate that location privacy not only refers to the 
user, but also to critical locations supposed to be secret. 
 
4.2 Unexpected location-based advertising by 
sharing location data with data aggregators  
 
The second archetype can be found in the cases 5 and 
7. In case 5, the provider of GasBuddy, an app to check 
prices of nearby gas stations, sold data on user’s latitude, 
longitude, and IP address together with timestamps and 
user’s Ad ID, a code that uniquely identifies a particular 
person for advertising purposes, to the data aggregation 
and location-based marketing company Reveal Mobile. 
Reveal Mobile then shared the data with location-based 
advertisers, who were able to accurately retrace where 
and when users of GasBuddy have been. 
However, while apps like GasBuddy can easily be 
uninstalled, changing the mobile carrier is cumbersome. 
In case 7, the four major mobile carriers AT&T, Sprint, 
T-Mobile, and Verizon sold their customers’ real-time 
location data received via cell tower usage to the data 
aggregators LocationSmart and Zumigo, who resold the 
data in a prepared form to advertisers and other actors 
like Microbilt, a company that offers phone tracking 
services. Figure 4 shows the dark sides of this archetype. 
While GasBuddy legitimizes the collection of location 
data by its service provision, the mobile carriers lean on 
purposes of roadside assistance and fraud prevention. In 
this archetype, the first dark side occurs when location 
data is sent to a data aggregator without the expectation 
of users and out of the context of the service provided. 
Next, the data aggregators process the data and then 
resell it to fourth parties like advertisers. Last, the fourth 
parties influence people based on their location or even 
offer controversial phone tracking apps like Microbilt’s 
Mobile Device Verify. In this regard, case 7 highlights 
another dimension of LBS: they can appear as phone 
tracking apps, where the target is not an object like a gas 
station, but the location of a specific person’s device.  
  
 
Figure 4. Architectural Map of mobile carriers 
selling location data (case 7) 
 
4.3 Hidden integration of location-based 
services in mobile applications 
 
Regarding the third dark side archetype, users are 
unaware that certain mobile apps include some kind of 
LBS tracking their location, since location data is not 
necessary to fulfill an application’s actual purpose. In 
case 2 for example, the former movie ticketing service 
MoviePass collected and potentially shared the location 
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data of its users with third parties. Users assumed that 
MoviePass collected data on ticket sales and movie 
choices, rather than detailed location data that allows 
tracking users before and after watching a movie. In 
addition, they claimed MoviePass did not disclose the 
location tracking in their privacy policy. Figure 5 shows 
the two dark sides of this archetype. First, users are 
tracked without their knowledge or even expectation, as 
location data is not necessary to fulfill the actual purpose 
of a service. Second, this data then might be sold to third 
parties that influence users based on their location. 
 
 
Figure 5. Architectural map of MoviePass 
secretly tracking user locations (case 2) 
 
Other examples for this dark side archetype are given 
by the cases 3, 10, and 12. While in case 3 a study found 
that 184 kid-targeted apps like Fun Kid Racing secretly 
collected and presumably shared GPS data, in case 10 
Netflix’s Android app tracked the location of several 
users without asking for permission. In case 12, TikTok, 
a social video app, is accused in a California lawsuit of 
sending personally identifiable user data, such as phone 
numbers and location data, to third parties like Appsflyer 
and Facebook. The Pentagon even classified TikTok as 
a security threat as it is also accused of storing this data 
on Chinese servers, which the government could access 
under Chinese law. All four cases emphasize that LBS 
are secretly integrated into various mobile apps without 
being relevant for service provision. They often appear 
outside the context of use and without user’s knowledge. 
 
4.4 Approximation of user locations by 
aggregating multiple data types  
 
The key characteristic of the fourth archetype is the 
determination of the user location by collecting and 
aggregating different types of data, even though users 
explicitly denied access to their location data. In case 8, 
the AccuWeather app transmitted user’s device data to 
Reveal Mobile, which approximated locations of users 
based on this data, although the users opted out of giving 
access to their location data (see Figure 6). The first dark 
side is that Reveal Mobile’s SDK implemented in the 
AccuWeather app triggers the collection and transfer of 
device data. Next, the AccuWeather app continuously 
collects the device’s Bluetooth status and the name and 
unique BSSID (basic service set identifier) of the WiFi 
router in use from the iOS operating system, and sends 
this data to Reveal Mobile every few hours. Aggregating 
the data, Reveal Mobile then approximates the location 
of users and sells this information to fourth parties. 
 
 
Figure 6. Architectural map of AccuWeather 
sending device data to Reveal Mobile (case 8) 
 
In case 9, the photo-editing app Shutterfly defied 
user permissions by gleaning precise phone location 
data from photos and sending this data to its provider’s 
servers. Even though the users denied access to location 
data, Shutterfly used the EXIF (exchangeable image file 
format) metadata that is generated by cameras and that 
integrates GPS coordinates and timestamps into photos. 
By aggregating this data, movements of users can be 
tracked. Both cases demonstrate that LBS are able to 
locate users even without having access to location data. 
 
4.5 Extensive profiling by amassing user’s 
location data  
 
The fifth dark side archetype refers to LBS that are 
constantly tracking users, even when they are asleep or 
are actually not using the service. Based on this data 
deluge, LBS providers gain detailed insights about the 
life of their customers. A prominent example is Niantic, 
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the creator of popular mobile augmented reality games 
like Pokémon GO and Harry Potter: Wizards Unite, who 
amasses location data of its players (case 11). Figure 7 
shows the four dark sides our analysis revealed. First, 
while players allow Niantic’s games to collect location 
data for proper functionality, they do not expect being 
tracked with such a high frequency, even when they are 
not playing, since this is not clarified in the privacy 
statements of the games. Second, the location data is 
sent to Niantic’s server. Third, by processing the data, 
Niantic can discern individual patterns of user behavior 
and details about players, such as the number of calories 
they likely burned, the distance they traveled, and the 
promotions they engaged with. Some people might also 
play multiple games simultaneously, which increases the 
variety and precision of insights. Fourth, Niantic sells the 
location data and detailed profiles to third parties.  
 
 
Figure 7. Architectural Map of Niantic 
amassing location data for profiling (case 11)  
 
Another example is the Weather Company, which is 
accused of deceptively using its Weather Channel app to 
amass location data by tracking movements in minute 
detail, while making users believe their data would only 
be used to localize weather reports (case 6). According 
to the lawsuit, the company analyzed the data to identify 
daily habits, shopping preferences, and even the identity 
of users. Then, the profiles and location data were sold. 
 
4.6 Misuse of protective location-based services 
 
The latest reports we found refer to LBS that intend 
to provide protection for users, but have been misused 
for several purposes. Therefore, we identified the sixth 
archetype across the cases 13, 14, and 15. In case 13, the 
family locator Life360, which is already controversially 
discussed because of its child tracking function, collects 
not only location data of people, but also, for example, 
their driving speed and the battery life of their phones. 
The app shares the data with a risk-assessment firm that 
uses the data to calculate insurance prices. In case 14, a 
study found that the Neighbors app, which allows people 
to share video footage and to post on crime in their local 
area, leaked locations of devices via GPS coordinates 
not supposed to be accessible in any post. Consequently, 
exact positions of cameras and addresses of users were 
revealed. However, one of the most pressing privacy 
issues today is the use of contact tracing or COVID-19 
apps. While they play an important role in containing the 
virus, there are reports of related privacy concerns like 
governmental surveillance. In case 15, a review found 
that North and South Dakota’s Care19 app, created by 
ProudCrowd, sends data to the advertising and location 
technology firm Foursquare. Figure 8 illustrates the dark 
sides. First, Care19 has embedded Foursquare’s Pilgrim 
SDK that supports apps by converting location data into 
concrete names of places, but in this case also triggers 
the collection and sharing of a user’s Ad ID. Second, 
Care19 collects location data and the Ad ID from the 
user’s device. Third, together with a unique citizen code 
generated by the app, the data is sent to Foursquare. 
 
 
Figure 8. Architectural Map of Care19 sharing 
personal data with Foursquare (case 15)  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
 With the manifold advantages of LBS, an increase 
in privacy violations has been reported [9, 10]. Based on 
a multiple case study [18], in this paper we shed light on 
the diverse dark sides causing privacy violations in LBS. 
By following the paradigm of architectural thinking, we 
developed a notation for architectural maps that allow 
decomposing LBS from a socio-technical perspective 
and thereby facilitate understanding the diversity of dark 
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sides affecting location privacy. By comparing the dark 
sides across 15 privacy-critical cases, we identified six 
dark side archetypes emerging in widespread LBS. 
The archetypes highlight the various ways in which 
privacy violations in LBS can occur. Summarizing the 
dark sides per archetype, Table 3 gives an overview of 
each archetype’s key characteristics. In comparison, 
certain aspects are particularly worth mentioning. First, 
it is remarkable that permissions to track user locations 
are granted in the archetypes 1, 2, 5, and 6. While users 
are unaware of being tracked in archetype 3, they denied 
access to location data in archetype 4. Second, third 
parties like data aggregators or advertisers are directly 
part of the value chain in the archetypes 2, 4, 5, and 6. 
While in archetype 1 third parties are not involved in the 
value chain, in archetype 3 it is assumed that data is sold 
to third parties. Third, in the archetypes 1 and 5, the LBS 
providers process location data on a large scale, whereas 
they mainly distribute data in the archetypes 2, 4, and 6. 
In archetype 3, it is rather unclear to what extent LBS 
providers process location data and for what purpose. 
 
Table 3. Key characteristics of the identified 
dark side archetypes 
Dark side archetype Key characteristics 
(1) Leakage of secret 
locations through publicly 
available maps offered  
by LBS providers 
- No direct involvement of 
third parties like advertisers 
- Public map allows to infer 
sensitive routes and locations 
(2) Unexpected location-
based advertising by  
sharing location data with 
data aggregators 
- Data aggregators as central 
intermediaries of data sharing 
- Frequent context changes lead 
to unexpected advertising 
(3) Hidden integration of 
location-based services in 
mobile applications 
- LBS not necessary for service 
provision of focal application 
- Hidden tracking of users 
(4) Approximation of user 
locations by aggregating 
multiple data types 
- Defiance of user permissions 
- Location is determined by 
combining different data types 
(5) Extensive profiling  
by amassing user’s  
location data 
- Excessive data collection even 
if LBS are not actively used 
- Very detailed user profiling  
(6) Misuse of protective 
location-based services 
- Protective use of location data 
- Misuse of data for different 
purposes, such as advertising  
 
Our results contribute to research and practice alike. 
From an academic point of view, the notation and maps 
complement previous research on modeling privacy-
related elements in LBS. While existing privacy models 
often focus on classifying the different actors involved 
[11, 20, 29], our notation and related maps reveal dark 
sides causing privacy violations in LBS from a holistic 
architectural perspective. Moreover, differing between 
elements of actors, applications, and IT infrastructure 
layers helps understand socio-technical relations in LBS 
at a higher level of granularity. Our proposed notation 
and architectural maps additionally provide first steps 
towards extending architectural thinking, which has so 
far been discussed at the intra-organizational level [14, 
15, 16], by a multi-actor perspective and to the field of 
LBS. Our research also exemplifies how dark sides can 
be identified using news articles as a primary data source 
and then structured via archetypes [26]. This approach 
can be used in other domains to reveal and classify dark 
sides. Above all, research often falls short of considering 
the various ways in which location privacy is violated. 
While many studies focus on anonymizing location data 
in the dyadic relation between a user and LBS provider 
[3, 6, 8], they often do not take into account the sharing 
of additional identifiers like the Ad ID (e.g., archetypes 
2 and 6) or the inference of user locations by multiple 
data types (e.g., archetype 4). With our archetypes, we 
aim to increase sensitivity for the diversity of dark sides 
and underline the increasing influence of third parties. 
Our results also have several practical implications. 
As our research is based on architectural thinking, which 
claims to be lightweight and pragmatic, we only included 
privacy-related key elements for modeling LBS in the 
notation. Due to their simplicity, derived architectural 
maps foster a common terminology and understanding 
between different types of practitioners. Both business 
and regulatory stakeholders can visualize privacy issues 
based on our notation and receive a discussion basis. For 
example, during the evaluation of our results, lawyers 
acknowledged that architectural maps would be useful 
for analyzing and debating privacy violations and that 
such visualizations are too scarce in the legal literature. 
In addition, practitioners like LBS providers can refer to 
our maps and archetypes to assess privacy compliance, 
but also to gain insights into the various ways in which 
location data can be collected, shared, and misused. 
The results of our study are not without limitations. 
First, we only used 15 privacy-critical cases to identify 
the dark side archetypes. Considering more cases may 
have revealed further archetypes or led to a breakdown 
of those identified. Second, as we used news articles as 
a primary data source, some journalistic preconceptions 
may have affected the analysis. Nevertheless, according 
to Yin, news articles can serve as a source of empirical 
evidence [18]. Third, the results give rather an overview 
of privacy violations in LBS. An in-depth legal analysis 
per case needs to consider further aspects like purpose 
limitation [11], the distinction of push and pull services 
[22], and the evaluation of contextual integrity [21]. 
Future research is required to anchor architectural 
thinking in the domain of LBS, to improve the notation, 
and to complement the archetypes. Moreover, we can 
imagine a domain-specific modeling language for LBS 
or privacy research based on our notation. We encourage 
future research to study data sharing networks of LBS 
more intensively and to disclose the depth of dark sides. 
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